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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. : 
CASEY NEAL SWEAT, : Case No. 20718 
Defendant-Appellant 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a per curiam decision 
filed by this Court on April 8, 1986. Originally, this case was an 
appeal from a guilty plea and conviction of burglary, a second 
degree felony. The defendant was sentenced in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, before the Honorable 
John A. Rokich, Judge, to one to fifteen years imprisonment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at 1-2. 
ARGUMENT 
In its per curiam opinion, State v. Sweat, 31 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 29 (filed April 8, 1986), this Court has either overlooked or 
misapprehended the main contention advanced by Appellant's Brief. 
In this case, the Appellant, Casey Sweat, pleaded guilty to 
burglary, a second degree felony. A ninety-day diagnostic 
evaluation of Mr. Sweat was ordered prior to sentencing. The report 
prepared subsequent to that evaluation included uncorroborated 
statements that the defendant sexually assaulted the burglary 
victim. The allegations of sexual misconduct were never charged and 
were denied by Mr. Sweat (T. 2-3). The trial court sentenced the 
defendant on the basis of the report (T. 7). On appeal, Mr. Sweat 
contested the inclusion of the unsubstantiated allegations in the 
report which formed the basis for the judgefs sentencing decision. 
The opinion in this case states: "There is no clear 
indication in the record that defendant's sentence was based on the 
alleged sexual misconduct. In fact, the record undermines this 
statement. Just before imposing sentence, the trial judge stated: 
THE COURT: Well, taking all of the 
considerations, taking everything into 
consideration I don't see any legal reason why 
sentencing cannot be imposed at this time. 
Therefore, I'm going to impose sentence as 
follows: . . . (T. 7) 
The district court relied on the entire 90 day 
evaluation/presentence report in imposing sentence. That reliance 
resulted in prejudice to Mr. Sweat. 
The presentence report investigator recommended commitment 
to the Utah State Prison. (Appellant's Brief, Addendum A at 9). 
Immediately preceeding this recommendation is a discussion of the 
defendant's "sexual attacks upon the elderly woman." I^d. On the 
other hand, a psychologist, who had no knowledge of the sexual 
misconduct allegations, recommended that the defendant be placed in 
a substance abuse treatment facility. (Appellant's Brief, Addendum 
D at 2). Clearly, the judge's reliance on the erroneous allegations 
led him to the conclusion of the presentence report investigator 
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rather than the conclusion of the psychologist. The Appellant was 
obviously harmed by such a conclusion. 
The per curiam opinion in this case states that "so long as 
basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural 
fairness are afforded, the trial court has broad discretion in 
considering fany and all information that reasonably may bear on the 
proper sentence.f" J^ d. (citations omitted). In other words, 
sentencing proceedings are subject to the requirements of due 
process. However, the process in this case violated one of the most 
fundamental tenets of due process which the opinion completely 
ignored. 
A criminal defendant may not be convicted of a crime for 
which he is not charged. Indeed, this principle was recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948). 
The Court stated, "[i]t is as much a violation of due process to 
send an accused to prison following conviction of a charge on which 
he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that 
was never made." See, also, Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100 
(1979); Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974); and State v. Martin, 
679 P.2d 489 (Ariz. 1984) . 
The Utah Constitution sets out certain rights of the 
accused in criminal prosecutions. Article I, Section 12 states: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof . . . 
Further, Article I, Section 13 states: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information 
after examination and commitment by a magistrate 
No person can be tried and punished without first being charged. In 
this case, the trial judge determined punishment for the defendant 
after considering uncharged, unsubstantiated allegations. This is 
clearly at odds with any notion of due process. 
In his opening brief, the Appellant contended that an 
accused is entitled to have a judge rely on accurate information in 
imposing sentence. (Appellant's Brief at 4) Indeed, in State v. 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980), this Court stated: "The 
fair administration of justice at the least requires that the 
information upon which the judge relies in imposing punishment is 
accurate." This position was reaffirmed in State v. Howell, 707 
P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985), in which this Court stated: "The due 
process clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
requires that sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and 
relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing sentence." 
Any sentence which is based, in part, on unreliable information must 
be remanded. United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2nd Cir. 
1973); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971); State 
v. Gibson, 681 P.2d 1 (Idaho App. 1984). 
In this case, the presentence report contained allegations 
of significant sexual misconduct on the part of Mr. Sweat. However, 
the allegations were in the form of unsubstantiated, second hand 
reports from the victim who took several days to report the alleged 
sexual misconduct. The allegations were apparently insufficient to 
support the instigation of criminal charges. (Appellant's Brief at 
5-7). Such unsubstantiated claims are far from the "accurate 
information" envisioned by Lipsky and Howell. 
Sentencing in felony cases in this state can result in the 
second-most severe penalty that a state can impose—deprivation of 
an individual's liberty for a significant length of time. Only the 
penalty of death is more severe. In light of the severity of the 
penalty, the issue in this case is simple: Should this Court 
require a sentencing judge to act only on information that is 
accurate, reliable, and trustworthy? The alternative is to allow a 
judge to impose sentence based on innuendo, rumor, and falsehood. 
To allow the latter would gut the notion of due process at the 
sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this court either misapprehended or overlooked 
appellant's primary contention in its decision in this case, the 
appellant respectfully petitions this Court to reconsider that 
decision and reverse and remand his sentence for redetermination. 
Respectfully submitted this ^^ day of April, 1986. 
CURTIS C. NESSET^ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
I hereby certify that I delivered four copies of the 
foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of April, 1986. 
CERTIFICATION 
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for appellant/petitioner in this 
case and; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 22 day of April, 1986* 
CURTIS C. NESSET ^ 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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